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Abstract 
This paper introduces the notions of independence 
and conditional independence in valuation-based 
systems (VBS). VBS is an axiomatic framework 
capable of representing many different uncertainty 
calculi. We define independence and conditional 
independence in terms of factorization of the joint 
valuation. The definitions of independence and 
conditional independence in VBS generalize the 
corresponding defmitions in probability theory. 
Our definitions apply not only to probability 
theory, but also to Dempster-Shafer's belief-func­
tion theory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and 
Zadeh's possibility theory. In fact, they apply to 
any uncertainty calculi that fit in the framework 
of valuation-based systems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of conditional independence between two sub­
sets of variables given a third has been extensively studied 
in probability theory [Dawid 1979, Spohn 1980, 
Lauritzen 1989, Pearl1988, Smith 1989, Geiger 1990]. 
The concept of conditional independence in probability 
theory has been interpreted in terms of relevance. If r, s 
and t are disjoint subsets of variables, then to say that r 
and s are conditionally independent given t, means that the 
conditional distribution of r, given values of s and t, are 
governed by the value of t alone-further information 
about the value of s is irrelevant. 
The concept of conditional independence for variables has 
also been studied in Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs 
[Spohn 1988, Hunter 1991]. However, the concept of in­
dependence for variables has not been studied in Dempster­
Shafer' s theory of belief functions [Dempster 1967, Shafer 
1976] or in Zadeh's possibility theory [Zadeh 1979, 
Dubois and Prade 1988].1 
1 Dempster [1967], Shafer [1976, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1990], 
and Smets [1986] have defmed independence for belief 
functions, but not for variables on which belief functions are 
defined. Shafer [1976] has defmed independence for frames of 
discenunent, a concept further studied by Shafer, Shenoy and 
Mellouli [1987]. Belief functions in belief-function theory 
are analogs of probability functions in probability theory. 
An abstract framework that unifies various uncertainty 
calculi is that of valuation-based systems [Shenoy 1989, 
199Ia]. In VBS, knowledge about a set of variables is rep­
resented by a valuation for that set of variables. There are 
three operators in VBS that are used to make inferences. 
These are called combination, marginalization, and re­
moval. Combination represents aggregation of knowledge. 
Marginalization represents coarsening of know ledge. And 
removal represents disaggregation of knowledge. 
The framework of VBS is able to uniformly represent 
probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function the­
ory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possi­
bility theory. In this paper, we will develop the notion of 
independence and conditional independence for variables in 
the framework of VBS. One advantage of this generality is 
that all results developed here will apply uniformly to all 
uncertainty calculi that fit in the framework of VBS. Thus 
the results described in this paper apply to, for example, 
probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function the­
ory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possi­
bility theory. 
What does it mean for two disjoint subsets of variables to 
be independent? Intuitively, independence can be defined in 
terms of factorization of the joint valuation. If t is a valu­
ation for rus, then we say that r and s are independent 
with respect to t iff t factors into two valuations, one 
whose domain only involves r, and the other whose do­
main only involves s. One implication of this is that if 
we are interested in constructing a valuation for rvs, then 
independence of r and s allows us to construct this valua­
tion by, frrst, constructing two valuations-one whose 
domain involving only r and the other whose domain in­
volving only s-and second, by simply combining the 
two valuations to get the result. 
What does it mean for two disjoint subsets of variables to 
be conditionally independent given a third disjoint subset? 
Conditional independence can also be described in terms of 
factorization of the joint valuation. Suppose 't is a valua­
tion for rusul We say rand s are conditionally indepen­
dent given t with respect tot iff the valuation t factors 
into two valuations, one whose domain involves variables 
in rut, and the other whose domain involves only vari­
ables in sut. 
An outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we 
describe the frameworlc of valuation-based systems (VBS). 
The VBS framework was described earlier in [Shenoy 
1989, 1991a]. Here we extend the framework by defining 
three new classes of valuations called normal, proper nor­
mal, and positive proper normal. Also, we introduce a 
new operator called removal, and defme some new axioms 
for the removal operator. Shenoy [1991b] shows how 
probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function the­
ory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possi­
bility theory fit in the framework of VBS. 
In section 3, we defme independence and conditional inde­
pendence for sets of variables. We show that these defmi­
tions satisfy some well known propenies that have been 
stated by Dawid [1979], Spohn [1980], Lauritzen [1989], 
Pearl [1988], and Smith [1989] in the context of probabil­
ity theory. Using Pearl's terminology, the conditional in­
dependence relation in VBS is a graphoid. Finally, in sec­
tion 4, we make some concluding remarks. Proofs of all 
results can be found in [Shenoy 1991b]. 
2 VALUATION-BASED SYSTEMS 
In this section, we describe the framework of valuation­
based systems (VBS). In a VBS, we represent knowledge 
by entities called variables and valuations. We infer inde­
pendence relations using three operators called combina­
tion, marginalization, and removal. We use these opera­
tors on valuations. 
The framework ofVBS is described in [Shenoy 1989, 
1991a]. The motivation there was to describe a local com­
putational method for computing marginals of the joint 
valuation. In this paper, we embellish the VBS framework 
by introducing three new classes of valuations called nor­
mal, proper normal, and positive proper normal, and by 
introducing a new operator called removal. Our motivation 
here is to define independence and describe its properties. 
Variables We assume there is a fmite set X whose ele­
ments are called variables. Variables will be denoted by 
upper-case letters, X, Y, Z, etc. Subsets of X will be de­
noted by lower-case letters, r, s, t, etc. 
Valuations For each s�$, there is a set 'If 5• We call 
the elements of '\1 5 valuations for s. Let V denote 
u { V 5 I s�X } , the set of all valuations. If cr is a valua­
tion for s, then we say that s is the domain of cr. 
Valuations will be denoted by lower-case Greek alphabets, 
p, cr, t, etc. 
Valuations are primitives in our abstract framework and, 
as such, require no definition. But as we shall see shortly, 
they are objects which can be combined, marginalized, and 
removed. A valuation for s represents some knowledge 
about variables in s. 
In probability theory, with each variable X, we associate a 
set '\If x called the frame for X. Also for each �X, we as­
sociate the set '\If 5 = x { '\If x I Xe s) called the frame for s. 
Elements of '\If 5 are called configurations of s. In proba-
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bility theory, for example, a valuation for s is a function 
cr:'UI' s�IR. where R is the set of all real numbers. 
Zero Valuations For each s�X. there is at most one 
valuation �sE '\J 5 called the zero valuation for s. Let Z 
denote { �s I S!;;;X}, the set of all zero valuations. Note 
that we are not assuming zero valuations always exist. If 
zero valuations do not exist, Z = 0. We call valuations in 
'\J -Z nonzero valuations. Intuitively, a zero valuation 
represents knowledge that is internally inconsistent. In 
probability theory, for example, a zero valuation for s is 
the valuation �s such that �5(x) = 0 for all xe 'UI' 5• 
Proper Valuations For each subset s of$, there is a 
subset P5 of V 5-{�5). We call the elements of P5proper 
valuations for s. Let P denote u{ P s I s�X ), the set of 
all proper valuations. Intuitively, a proper valuation repre­
sents knowledge that is partially coherent In probability 
theory, for example, a proper valuation is a nonzero valua­
tion cr such that cr(x) � 0 for all xe cur 5• 
Normal Valuations For each s�X, there is another 
subset 'JI. s of V 5-{ �s}. We call the elements of 'JI. s nor­
mal valuations for s. Let 'J1. denote u { 'JI. 5 I � $ ) , the set 
of all normal valuations. Intuitively, a normal valuation 
represents knowledge that is partially coherent in a sense 
different from proper valuations. In probability theory, for 
example, a normal valuation is a nonzero valuation cr 
such that :E[cr(x) I XE cur sl = 1. 
Proper Normal Valuations For each s�$, let� 5 
denote P 8n'J\. 8• We call the elements of 1\5 proper nor­
mal valuations for s. Let 1\ denote u(l\5 I s�X) , the set 
of all proper normal valuations. Intuitively, a proper nor­
mal valuation represents knowledge that is completely co­
herent. 
Positive Proper Normal Valuations For each 
s� $, there is a subset 1\ s + of 1\ 5• We call the elements 
of 1\5+ positive proper normal valuations for s. Let 1\ + 
denote u( 1\ s + I sr;;;;$), the set of all positive proper Mr­
mal valuations. As we will see later, positive proper nor­
mal valuations are proper normal valuations that have 
unique identities. In probability theory, for example, a 
positive proper normal valuation for s is a proper normal 
valuation cr such that cr(x) > 0 for all xe cur 5• 
Figure 1 shows the relations between the different types of 
valuations. As per our defmitions, Z�'lf, P�('V -Z ), 
'J\.QV -Z), 1\ = Pn'n., and 1\ +!:;1\. 
Combination We assume there is a mapping 
(£);'\Jx'\1 � 'JI. uZ, called combination, such that the 
following axioms are satisfied: 
(Cl) (Domain) If p and a are valuations for r and s, re­
spectively, then p€£lcr is a valuation for rus. 
(C2) (Associative) p€£l(cr€£lt) = (pea)et. 
(C3) (Commutative) pea= aep. 
(C4) (Zero) Suppose zero valuations exist, suppose cr is a 
valuation for s, and suppose pis a valuation for r. Then 
cr€£lCr = �s€£lP = �rus· 
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that for each S!::X.  (f\.5+, ffi) is a commutative 
subsemigroup. 
Identity Valuations We will assume that 
for each s�$, and for each cre 11. 8u { �sl. there 
exists at least one identity for it, i.e., there ex­
ists &,€ 11.su{�5) such that <JffiS0: cr. A val­
uation may have more than one identity. 
Axiom C4 states that every element of 
11.su( �s} is an identity for �s· Note that if 
cre 11. s• then &,€ 11. s (Proof: If So : �s. then 
crffiSo: Gffi�s: 's 'i' cr, contradicting the fact 
that S0 is an identity for cr). 
Also. we will assume that for each s�$. the 
commutative subsemigroup 11. 5u { �s} has an 
identity, denoted by t5, which is positive 
proper normal. In other words, there exists 
LsE 1\ 5 + such that for each cre 11. s, crffits = cr. 
Note that a commutative semigroup may have 
Fi 1: The Relations Between Different T s of Valuations at most one identity. Also, t5 is an identity for L...-.....::..:=::.::...=.:....::.::::;..:.;;:==�;:.;.:,;.;.;;;::::...:;;.==:.:..:..u;:;::::;:..:;::....:..:::..::=:;::.::;:�...J each element of 11. 5U { �5). 
(C5) (Nonzero) If p and cr are both nonzero valuations, 
then p$cr is either normal or zero. 
(C6) (Proper) If p and cr are both proper valuations, then 
pfficr is either proper normal or zero. 
(C7) (Positive Proper Normal Valuations) If p and cr are 
both positive proper normal, then pfficr is positive proper 
normal. 
If pfficr, read as p plus cr, is a zero valuation, then we say 
that p and cr are inconsistent. If pfficr is a normal valua­
tion, then we say that p and cr are consistent . 
Intuitively. combination corresponds to aggregation of 
knowledge. If p and cr are valuations for r and s represent­
ing knowledge about variables in r and s. respectively, 
then pffi<J represents the aggregated knowledge about vari­
ables in rus. In probability theory. for example, combina­
tion is pointwise multiplication followed by normaliza­
tion (if normalization is possible). 
An implication of Axiom C2 is that when we have mul­
tiple combinations of valuations, we can write it without 
using parenthesis. For example, ( ... ((cr1$cr2)ecr3)ffi ... $crm) can be written simply as crt $ ... EScrm without 
parenthesis. Further, by Axiom C3, we can write 
crt$ ... fficrm simply as ffi{crt. ... , crm}. i.e .• not only do 
we not need parenthesis, we need not indicate the order in 
which the valuations are combined. Mathematically. 
Axioms C2 and C3 imply that the pair ('\I , ES) is a com­
mutative semigroup [Petrich 1973]. 
An implication of Axioms Cl, C2, C3, C4 and C5 is 
that the set 11. 5u(,5} together with the combination oper­
ation $ can be regarded as a commutative subsemigroup. 
(If zero valuations do not exist. then 11. 5u(�5) = 'Jl. 5). By 
Axiom C4, if zero valuations exist, then the valuation �s 
is the zero of the subsemigroup 'Jl. 5u{ Csl. It follows from 
Axiom C6 that for each s�X. (fl. 5u{,sl. $) is a com­
mutative subsemigroup, and it follows from Axiom C7 
We will assume that for each s�$, and for 
each cre tt 5u { �s), there exists at least one identity for it, 
i.e., there exists Soe tt 5u ( 'sl such that cr$S0 =cr. Note 
that if cre fl. 5, then Soe fl. s· Also, since tt s is a subset 
of 11. s. and LsE t\. 8, ts is also the identity for the semi­
group 1\su{�s). 
We will assume that for each s�$, each element of 1\ s + 
has a unique identity. Since 1\ s +�1\ 5, and t5e 'Jl. s +, this 
implies that ls is the identity for each cr in t\. s +, i.e. S0 = 
t5 if cre tt +, and that t5 is the identity for tt 5 +. 
In probability theory, for examJ?le. the identity t5 for 
'J\.5u{ �s} is given by t8(x) = I71<J.lf 51 for all xe <J.If s· 
Suppose cr is a normal valuation for s. An identity S0 for 
cr is a proper normal valuation for s such that S0(x) = 1/K. 
if cr(x) 'i' 0. and S0(x) = either 0 or 1/K if cr(x) = 0. K is a 
constant whose value is determined by the fact that So is a 
normal valuation. 
Valuations for the Empty Set We will assume that 
the set 'Jl. 0 consists of exactly one element. This assump­
tion implies that fl. 0+ = tt 0 = 'Jl. 0 = ( 1.0} where 1.0 is 
the identity valuation for the empty seL Also, we will as­
sume that if cr is nonzero valuation for s, and �0 is a 
nonzero valuation for the empty set, then cr$�0 is not 
zero, i.e., cr$�0 is a normal valuation for s. This as­
sumption implies that if <X0 and 130 are nonzero valua­
tions for the empty set. then <X0fB�0 = 1.0· 
If cr is a nonzero valuation that is not normal, then <Jffit0 
* cr (since cr$1.0 is normal and cr is not). We can regard 
cr$1.0 as the "normalized" form of cr. 
Marginalization We assume that for each s�$. and for 
each Xes, there is a mapping J..(s-(X} ): V 5--+ 'V s-{X), 
called marginalization to s-{X}, such that it satisfies the 
following axioms: 
(Ml) (Domain) If a is a valuation for s, then a.l.(s-{X}) is 
a valuation for s-(X). 
(M2) (Order of Deletion) Suppose a is a valuation for s, 
and suppose X1, X2 E s. Then (CJJ.(s-{Xl}))J.(s-{Xt,X2)) 
= (cr!<s-
IX2}))J.<s-1Xt.x2n. 
(M3) (Nonzero) o-1-<s-{XD is nonzero iff a is nonzero. 
(M4) (Proper) If cr is a proper valuation, then a.l.(s-{X)) 
is a proper valuation. 
(M5) (Normal) a!(s-(X}) is normal iff a is normal. 
(M6) (Positive Proper Normal) If a is positive proper 
normal, then a..l..(s-{X}) is positive proper normal. 
We call cr..l..(s-{X}) the marginal of a for s-{X}. 
Intuitively, marginalization corresponds to coarsening of 
knowledge. If a is a valuation for s representing some 
knowledge about variables in s, and Xes, then cr!<s-{X)) 
represents the knowledge about variables in s-{X} implied 
by CJ if we disregard variable X. In probability theory, for 
example, marginalization to s-(X} is addition over the 
frame for X. 
If we regard marginalization as a coarsening of a valuation 
by deleting variables, then Axiom M2 says that the order 
in which the variables are deleted does not matter.2 One 
implication of this axiom is that 
(cr.!.(s-{Xl}))J.(s-{Xt.X2l) can be written simply as 
a..l..(s-{Xt,X2}), i.e., we need not indicate the order in 
which the variables are deleted. 
Axiom M3 is vacuous if zero valuations do not exist. An 
implication of M3 is that �s.i.(s-{X}) = �s-{X)· An im­
plication of Axiom M5 is that a valuation a for s is nor­
mal iff crJ,0 = 1.0· 
We will assume further that the marginalization and com­
bination operators satisfies the following two axioms. 
Axiom CMl (Combination and Marginalization 1) 
Suppose cr is a normal valuation for s, suppose r�:s, 
and suppose �aJ.r is an identity for a!r. Then 
CJ$5a.Lr = CJ. 
Axiom CM2 {CombiMtion and MargiMiization 2) 
Suppose p and a are valuations for r and s, respec­
tively. Suppose Xu, and suppose Xes. Then 
(p$CJ).l.((rus)-{X)) = pE9(a..l..(s-{X) )). 
2 Axiom M2 is equivalent to the "consonance of 
marginalization" axiom in [Shenoy and Shafer 1990], which 
is stated as follows: If a is a valuation for s, and q 1: r 1: s, 
then (a..l..r)J.q:::: a!q. 
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The following lemma states some easy implications of 
Axiom CM1.3 
Lemma 2.1 Suppose Axioms Cl-C7, Ml-M6, 
and CM 1 hold. Then the following statements hold. 
(i). If a is a normal valuation for s, and r�s. then 
CJEE!lr = CJ. 
(ii). If a and p are nonzero valuations, then aep..l..121 = 
CJEE!'-0. 
(iii). a is normal or zero iff CJE9l0 = cr. 
(iv). If r�s. then t5EE!tr = t8• 
(v). t5EE!tr = lrus· 
Axiom CM2 states that the computation of 
(pEE!a)..l..((rus)-{X)) can be accomplished without having 
to compute pea. The combination pED<r is a valuation for 
rvs whereas the combination pEE!(a.l.(s-{X} )) is a valua­
tion for (rus}-{X). The following lemma is an easy con­
sequence of Axiom CM2.4 
Lemma 2.2 Suppose Axioms Cl-C3, Ml, M2, 
and CM2 hold. Suppose p is a valuation for r and 
suppose CJ is a valuation for s. Then (pEE!CJ)J..r = 
peaJ.rns. 
Axioms Cl, C2, C3, Ml, M2, and CM2 make local 
computation of marginals possible. Suppose {crt • ... , 
CJm} is a collection of valuations, and suppose <:Ji is a val­
uation for Si. Suppose % = s1 u ... USm, and suppose 
Xe �-Suppose we wish to compute (crtE9 ... EE!crm)..I..{X}. 
We can do so by successively deleting all variables but X 
from the collection of valuation {cr1, ... , CJm}. Each time 
we delete a variable, we do a fusion operation defined as 
follows. Consider a set of k valuations Ph ... , Pk· 
Suppose Pi is a valuation for rj. Let Fusy ( p 1, ... , Pk} de­
note the collection of valuations after fusing the valua­
tions in the set { p 1, ... , Pk) with respect to variable 
YErtu ... Ufic. Then 
Fusy{pl, ... , Pk} = {p.l.(r-{Y})}u{pi I Yell} 
where p =${pi I YErj}, andr=u{ri I Yeq}. After fu­
sion, the set of valuations is changed as follows. All val­
uations whose domains include Y are combined, and the 
resulting valuation is marginalized such that Y is elimi­
nated from its domain. The valuations whose domains do 
not include Y remain unchanged. The following theorem 
3 In [Cano, Delgado, and Moral 1991, and Shafer 1991], 
statemen t (iv) of Lemma 2.1 is stated as an axiom. [Shafer 
1991) proves statement (v) of Lemma 2.1 assuming statement 
(iv). 
4 The statement of Lemma 2.2 was fust stated as an axiom in 
[Shenoy and Shafer 1990]. Shenoy (199la] stated axiom 
CM2, which is stronger than the statement of Lerruna 2.2. 
The added strength of axiom CM2 has advantages in the 
computation of marginals-see Theorem 2.1. 
2t\S Shenoy 
describes the fusion algorithm, a method for computing 
(crtEB ... EBcrm)J..{X} using only local computations. 
Theorem 2.1 [Shenoy 1991a] Suppose (0'1, ..• 
, 
O"m) is a collection of valuations such that O"i is a 
valuation for Si· Suppose Axioms Cl ,  C2, C3, Ml, 
M2, and CM2 hold. Let$ denote S}V ••• VSm. 
Suppose Xe $,and suppose XtX2···Xn�l is a se­
quence of variables in ��{X). Then 
(criEB ... EBom)J.{X) = E9 { Fusxn�l { ... 
Fusx2{Fusx1 {crt • ... , O'm)}}
}
. 
Removal We assume there is a mapping 
®:VxV � <J\.vZ, called removal, such that the follow­
ing axioms are satisfied: 
(Rl) (Domain) Suppose o is a valuation for s, and sup­
pose p is a valuation for r. Then cr®p is a valuation for 
rvs; 
(R2) (Zero) Suppose zero valuations exist, suppose o is a 
valuation for s, and suppose p is a valuation for r. Then 
cr®�r = �s®P = Crus· 
(R3) (Nonzero) Suppose cr and pare nonzero valuations 
for s and r respectively. Then cr®p is either normal or 
zero. 
(R4) (Normal) Suppose pis a normal valuation for r. 
Then there exists an identity �p for p such that p®p = �p-
We call a®p, read as 0' minus p, the valuation resulting 
after removing p from cr. 
Intuitively, cr®p can be interpreted as follows. If cr and p 
represent some lmowledge, and if we remove the knowl­
edge represented by p from 0', then cr®p describes the 
knowledge that remains. In probability theory, for exam­
ple, removal is pointwise division followed by nonnaliza­
tion (if normalization is possible). 
We assume the following two axioms that relate the re­
moval operator to the combination and the marginaliza­
tion operators. 
Axiom CR (Combination and Removal) Suppose 
n, e, p are valuations for p, q, and r, respectively. 
Then 
(xEB9)®p = xEB(9®p), 
1t®(9EBp) = (x®e)®p, and 
x®(9®p) = (x®9)EBp 
Axiom MR (Marginalization and Removal) 
Suppose cr is a valuation for s, suppose pis a valua­
tion for r, suppose Xes, and suppose X E. r. Then 
(a®p)J.((rvs)-{X}) = a.l.(s�(X})®p. 
It follows from Axioms C2, C3 and CR that (xEB9)®p "' 
(x®p )e9. The following lemma states some easy conse­
quences of Axiom R4. 
Lemma 2.3 Suppose cr is a valuation for s, and 
suppose pis a normal valuation for r. Then the fol­
lowing statements hold. 
(i). ((crEBp)®p ).l.s = crffi'-0. 
(ii). If cr is nonnal, then {(crEBp)®p )J.s"' cr. 
(iii). ((crEBp)®p).l.sep = crEBp. 
(iv). ((crEBp)®p)ep = csep. 
(v). If p is positive proper normal, then p®p = tr. 
(vi). If pis positive proper normal, then (crEBp)®p = 
crEBtr. 
(vii). If cr is normal, and p is positive proper normal, 
then (O"EBp)®p =cr. 
(viii). If cr is normal, and r�s. then (cr®cr.J.I)ecr.l.r = 
0". 
(ix). If cr is normal, and r�s. then cr®a.l.r is normal. 
(x). If cs is normal, and r�:;s, then cr®tr =cr. 
(xi). If 0' is normal, and r�;;;s, then there exists an 
identity �o!.r for cr.J.r such that (cr®cr.l.l)J..r = Bu-1-r· 
Conditional Valuations. Suppose 0' is a proper nor­
mal valuation for s, and suppose rg;. The normal valua-
tion cs®o.l.r for s plays an important role in the theory of 
independence. Borrowing tenninology from probability 
theory, we call o-®cs.l.r the conditional for s-r given r. 
Conditional valuations have two important properties: 
(cr®oJ.I)ecr.l.r = cr, and (a®cr.l.I)J.r = �o!.r· 
3 INDEPENDENCE AND 
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
In this section, we defme independence and conditional in­
dependence in terms of factorization of the joint valuation. 
Also, we show that these definitions imply the well 
known properties of independence and conditional indepen­
dence in probability theory [Dawid 1979, Spohn 1980, 
Lauritzen 1989] and in other domains [Pearl1988, Smith 
1989]. 
The essence of independence is as follows. We say disjoint 
subsets r and s are independent with respect to a proper 
normal valuation tiff tJ.(rus) factors into two valuations 
p and cr, where p is a valuation for r, and 0' is a valuation 
for s. 
The definition of independence is either objective or sub­
jective depending on whether we have an objective or sub­
jective measure of knowledge represented by proper nor­
mal valuation t. In probability theory, in some cases, we 
start with an objective specification of a joint probability 
distribution of all variables. This joint probability distri­
bution then serves as an objective measure of knowledge, 
and all statements of independence are objective with re­
spect to this state of knowledge. In other cases, however, 
we do not start always with a joint probability distribu­
tion. In such cases, the first task is to specify a joint 
probability distribution. To make this specification task 
simpler, we make assertions of independence that are nec­
essarily subjective. However, once we have a specification 
of a joint probability distribution (obtained either objec-
tively or subjectively), all further statements of indepen­
dence are necessarily objective with respect to the joint 
probability distribution. 
Lett be a proper nonnal valuation for �- We will hence­
forth assume that t represents the global knowledge re­
garding all variables in the VBS. For example, in proba­
bility theory, t would represent the joint probability dis­
tribution for all variables in �. 
Definition 3.1 (Independence) Suppose tis a 
proper normal valuation for$, and suppose r, s� $, 
rns = 0. We say r ands are independelll with respect 
to f, written as r ..i't s, ifft.l.(rus) = pEBo, where p 
and o are valuations for r and s, respectively. 
When it is clear that all independence statements are with 
respect tot, we will simply say 'r and s are independent' 
instead of 'r and s are independent with respect to t,' and 
use the simpler notation r ..i s instead of r � s. 
Theorem 3.1 (Symmetry) Suppose tis a proper 
normal valuation for$, and suppose r, s � $, rr.s = 
0. If r .l s, then s .l r. 
The following lemma gives alternative characterizations of 
the independence relation.5 
Lemma 3.1 Suppose tis a proper normal valuation 
for $, and suppose r, s � X, rr.s = 0. The following 
statements are equivalent 
(i). r .l s. 
(ii). t.l.(rus) = pEBa, where panda are valuations for 
r and s, respectively. 
(iii). tJ..(rus) = t!ret.!.s. 
(iv). There exists an identity 5'tJ.r for tJ..r such that 
t!(rus)®t.!.r = aEB5'tJ.r, where a is a valuation for s. 
(v). There exists an identity 5'tJ.r for t.!.r such that 
t.!.(rus)®t.!.r = t.!.se5'tJ.r . 
Defmition 3. 2 generalizes Defmition 3.1 for any number 
of subsets of variables. 
Definition 3.2 (Joint Independence) Suppose t is 
a proper normal valuation for $, and suppose f1, ... , 
rn are disjoint subsets of X. We say rJ, ...• rn are 
ljointly) independent with respect to f, written as 
' { } "
ff !(rl u ... Urn) m m h .L't T}. ••• , rn , 1 t = p l w ... wpn, W ere 
Pi is a valuation for ri, i = 1, ... , n. 
5 The statements of Lemma 3.1 are analogs of corresponding 
statements in [Dawid 1979] in the context of probability 
theory. Our contribution here is in showing that these 
statements hold in our more general framework of VBS. Thus 
they hold not only in probability theory (as shown by Dawid 
[1979]) but also in other uncertainty calculi that fit in the 
framework of VBS. 
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Defmition 3.2 is a generalization of Definition 3.1. Note 
that r ..i s iff .l { r, s}. We know from probability theory 
that functions of independent random variables are inde­
pendenL If X 1 and X2 are independent random variables, 
then f(X 1) and g(X2) are also independent random vari­
ables. More generally, if Xt • ... , Xn are independent, {Nt. 
... , Nk} is a partition of the set {XJ, .•. , Xn}. and Yj is a 
function of the Xi in Nj. then Y 1· ••• , Y k are independenL 
The following lemma makes an analogous statemenL 6 
Lemma 3.1 Suppose tis a proper nonnal valuation 
for$, and suppose r1, ... , r0 are disjoint subsets of 
$.Suppose ..i{q, ... , r0}. Suppose {Nt • ..
. , Nk} is 
a partition of { 1, ... , n}, i.e., Nir.Nj = 0 if i * j, and 
NtU ... UNk= (1, ... , n}. Suppose Sj�(u{rjliENj)). 
for j = 1, .•. , k. Then ..i(st .... , Sk}. 
The statement in the following corollary to Lemma 3.2 is 
called decomposition [Pearl 1988]. It is a special case of 
Lemma3.2. 
Corollary (Decomposition) Suppose tis a proper 
normal valuation for$, suppose r, s, tare disjoint 
subsets of$, and suppose r ..i (sut) . Then r .l s. 
The following lemma gives four alternative characteriza­
tions of joint independence. 7 
Lemma 3.3 Suppose t is a proper nonnal valuation 
for$, and suppose ft, ... , r0 are disjoint subsets of 
$. Then the following statements are equivalent. 
(i) . .l(q, ... , rn} 
("") !(rl u ... urn) m m h . a1 n .  t = Ptw ... wpn. w ere Pi lS a v ua-
tion for rj, i = 1, ... , n. 
("'") .!.(rlu ... urn) _ .l.rlm m J..rn 111 • t - t w ... wt 
(iv) . .i{C}, ... , rn-tJ and (r}U ... Urn-1) .i rn. 
(v). ri ..i u {rj I j = 1, ... , n, j :F- i} for i= 1, •.. , n. 
(vi). rj .l (Tt u ... Urj-1) for j = 2, •.. , n. 
Defmition 3.3 defmes conditional independence for two 
subsets given a third. 
Definition 3.3 (Conditional Independence) 
Suppose t is a proper nonnal valuation for �.and 
suppose r, s, and t are disjoint subsets of$. We say r 
and s are conditionally independent given t with re-
spect to f, written as r ..i't s I t, iff t!(rusut) = 
O:rutEB<lsut> where CXrut and <lsut are valuations for 
rut and sut, respectively. 
The following lemma gives six alternative characteriza­
tions of conditional independence. 
6 An analogous statement is stated and proved in [Shafer, 
Shenoy, and Mellouli 1987] in the context of qualitative 
independence. 
1 The statements in Lemma 3.3 are analogs of corresponding 
statements in Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli [1987] in the 
context of qualitative independence. 
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Lemma 3.4 S uppose tis a proper nonnal valuation 
for�. and suppose r, s, and t are disjoint subsets of 
�. The following statements are equivalent. 
(i). r .l s I t. 
(ii). tJ.(rvsvt) = r:xrv1EDasvt• where arvt and asvt 
are valuations for rut and sut, respectively. 
(iii). tJ.(rvsvt)®tJ.t = �vtE9i3svto where f3rvt and 
i3svt are valuations for rut and sut, respectively. 
(iv). tJ.(rvsvt) = 
tJ.lEB(t.l.(rvt)®t.l.l)ED(t,l..(svt)®tJ.�. 
(v). t.!.(rvsvt)®tJ,t = 
(t.l.(rvt)®t.l.t)E9(t.l.(svt)®t.l.t). 
(vi). tJ.(rvsvt) = (tJ..(rvt)®tJ.l)EDt.l.(sut) 
(vii). There exists an identity s't!.(IIVt) for t.l.(svt) such 
that t.!.(rvsvt)®t.l.(svt) = (t.!.(rvt)®t.l.nea , -, 't"-(•ut)• 
(viii). There exists an identity S'tJ..(sut) for tJ..(svt) 
such that tJ.(rvsvt)®tJ..(svt) = arvtEDS't!.(sVl)· 
Theorem 3.2 states another property of independence. This 
property is called weak union [Pearl1988]. 
Theorem 3.2 (Weak Union) Suppose tis a proper 
nonnal valuation for �. and suppose r, s, and t are 
disjoint subsets of $. If r .l sut. then r l.. s It. 
Theorem 3.3 states another property of conditional inde­
pendence. This property is called contraction [Pearl1988]. 
Theorem 3.3 (Contraction) Suppose tis a proper 
normal valuation for$, and suppose r, s and t are 
disjoint subsets of $. If r .l s, and r .l t 1 s, then r l.. 
sut. 
The next theorem states a property of conditional indepen­
dence that holds only if the joint valuation t is positive 
proper nonnal. 
Theorem 3.4 (Intersection) Suppose tis a positive 
proper normal valuation for�. and suppose r, s, and 
t are disjoint subset of $ . If r .l s I t, and r .l t I s, 
then r .l svt. 
Defmition 3.4 generalizes Defmition 3.3 from two sub­
sets to any number of subsets. 
Definition 3.4 (Joint Conditional Independence) 
Suppose t is a proper nonnal valuation for $, and 
suppose rlt ... , rn. t are disjoint subsets of$. We 
say 'J, ... , r n are conditionally independent given t 
with respect to t', written as .l't { f1, ... , q} I t, iff 
J.(r1v ... vr0vt) ll:lo E9 h . t = Clr1vtw... arnVt• W ere ClriVt IS 
a valuation for riut, i = 1, ... , n. 
Pearl and Paz [1987] call a conditional independence rela­
tion that satisfies symmetry, decomposition, weak: union, 
conttaction, and intersection a graphoid. From Theorems 
3.1-3.4 and the corollary to Lemma 3.2, it follows that 
the defmition of conditional independence in Definition 
3.3 is a graphoid. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this paper is to defme independence 
and conditional independence in the framework of 
valuation-based systems. Although these concepts have 
been defmed and extensively studied in probability theory, 
they have not been extensively studied in non-probabilis­
tic uncertainty theories. 
Drawing upon the literature on independence in probabil­
ity theory [Dawid 1979, Spohn 1980, Lauritzen 1989, 
Pearl1988, Smith 1989], we defme independence and con­
ditional independence in VBS. The framework of VBS was 
defmed earlier by Shenoy [1989, 1991aJ. However, the 
VBS framework defmed there is inadequate for the pur­
poses of studying properties of independence. In this pa­
per, we embellish the framework by including three new 
classes of valuations called proper, normal, and positive 
proper normal, and by including a new operator called re­
moval. The new defmitions are stated in the fonn of ax­
ioms. Shenoy [199lb] shows that these axioms are gen­
eral enough to include probability theory, Dempster­
Shafer's belief-function theory, Spohn's epistemic belief 
theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory. 
The framework of VBS as described in this paper enables 
us to defme independence and conditional independence, 
and enables us to derive all major properties of conditional 
independence that have been derived in probability theory. 
Independence and conditiooal independence are defmed in 
tenns of factorization of the joint valuation. Thus, not 
only do we have a deeper understanding of independence in 
probability theory, we also understand what independence 
means in various non-probabilistic uncertainty theories. 
This should deflect some criticism that non-probabilistic 
uncertainty theories are not as well developed as probabil­
ity theory. 
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